Not Settling for a Draw
The US aid package arrives just in time, but Ukraine needs more than that to win
Chasiv Ya is like any other small Donetsk town: a cluster of Soviet-era apartment blocks, separated by patches of green, with benches and playgrounds. At least that’s how I remember it almost 18 months ago, when most of the town’s buildings were still standing, and the population still there, confident that the town would hold out against the Russians.
For those who are left, that confidence is now being tested. Chasiv Ya – with its elevated position flanked by a canal is key terrain for both sides – and the Russian Army is fighting to take it, before the recently passed US aid package has an effect on the battlefield.
Creeping Advance
Since late February, Russian forces have been inching forward in eastern Ukraine. First, they captured Avdivka – a small town that has been contested for over a year – then a series of villages to the west, marking Russia’s biggest advance in almost a year. Since early April they have been tightening the noose around Chasiv Ya – pounding the town’s defenders with some 17 shells for everyone fired in return. That will soon change. The first munitions from the $40 billion aid package recently passed by Congress have started to arrive at the front. And just in time.
On a battlefield in which every move for 10km behind friendly sides is visible to the enemy – the defender has an overwhelming advantage – at least, that was the lesson from last year. But the Russian Army have developed tactics which, combined with its institutional disregard for its own soldiers’ lives, have proven to be successful in overcoming Ukrainian defenses.
The Russians pre-cede their attacks with a barrage of loitering munitions, targeting known Ukrainian positions and targets of opportunity. First-person view loitering munitions are particularly terrifying compared to random shelling because of their ability to pursue their target – and the Russians have no shortage of them. At the same time Russian electronic jamming downs most Ukrainian drones in the area, blinding the defenders.
Russian squads – mounted on electric motorcycles, quadbikes, and lightly armed vehicles probe Ukrainian positions, advancing where they find gaps and bringing other assault squads with them. Surveillance drones and loitering munitions cover the attackers as they advance.
Stalemate
In the short term, the Russians will make a determined effort to take Chasiv Ya before the new munitions arrive. Once they do arrive, the Russian offensive will inevitably peter out. For all their advantages with munitions and oil – the Russians lack one critical component in the field: manpower. The Russian army can mass only enough troops to launch a single offensive along the front at any one time – and even then, it lacks sufficient manpower to exploit a breakthrough.
A Shortage of Trained Troops
For the Ukrainians, the shortage of trained soldiers is even more acute.
On 3 April, President Zelensky signed a bill lowering the conscription age from 27 to 25. The armed forces have been lobbying for such a law since last fall – and it will take months now to implement. What is more – as the generals no doubt are quick to point out - having a minimum conscription age of 25 still leaves a large portion of the military-age population untouched – which doesn’t sit well for a country at war and pressed for manpower.
It is the ability to train new recruits – to regenerate the force – that presents the greatest obstacle. Many battalions, already understrength, lack a sufficient cadre of experienced soldiers to train the others – something that commanders had previously been able to rely on to mitigate the loss of the country’s training institutions from the outset of the war. I wrote about this topic previously in my article ‘Not Enough Soldiers’.
Not just the troops
Changing the status quo at the front will require more than weapons and even manpower – it will require a change in how the army is led – which means training for its leaders.
Ukraine’s counter-offensive last year failed for a number of reasons: delayed arms deliveries from the West, the unexpected strength of Russian fortifications, miscalculations about concealment in a drone-saturated battlefield, and the strategic mistake of splitting forces between the east and the south. But also high on the list was a lack of skill. Ukrainian units, armed with unfamiliar western weapons were expected to conduct combined arms multi-domain warfare against a well-fortified defender backed by a massive weight of artillery and loitering munitions – after less than two months of training. Even the almost limitless courage of the Ukrainian soldier couldn’t make up for fundamental flaws in planning and resourcing the offensive.
The lack of experience on both sides in combined arms maneuver has kept much of the fighting at battalion and brigade level. The side that can up its ante in this regard will have a significant advantage.
Not settling for a draw
There can be no doubt of Ukrainian resolve. Despite the hardships, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians support the war, and want no settlement short of total Russian expulsion from Ukrainian soil.
The question now is whether this new infusion of weaponry, will enable Ukrainian forces to hold on to Chasiv Ya – key terrain for both sides on the approaches to Kharkiv. Seizing the town would bring the Russians closer to Kramatorsk, the only one of Donbas’s cities not yet in Russian hands. For that reason, the defenders of Chasiv Ya are determined to hold on. Morale in the Ukrainian military has remained consistently high - -remarkably so given the circumstances – but the shortage of ammunition had raised casualties and placed pressure on front line troops. News that relief was on its way was heralded with cheers in the Brigade operations room in Chasiv Ya. In the short term, the weapons will enable Ukraine to halt the Russian offensive. But it needs more trained soldiers to win.




I sure am looking forward to finally sitting down to read your book in the next few days and then leave a good amazon review. Happy 4th
Thanks for your writings Andrew.
There seems to be a contradiction here, in that while ‘an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians support the war’, as we see, an overwhelming majority of these same Ukrainians will no longer serve in the armed forces and defend their country unless forced to do so.
I’m not sure that this augurs particularly well for the future, as reluctant conscripts are unlikely to make proficient soldiers.