The Offensive Begins

What it lacks in surprise, the Ukrainians have made up for with ambiguity

On June 4^th, Ukrainian forces launched what Russia’s defense ministry called a “large-scale” assault on five axes in the south-east of Donetsk province, in eastern Ukraine.  

The Ukrainians have remained impressively mum about the offensive, leaving it to their adversary to make the announcement -- but certainly offensive operations are underway.  Ukraine’s Defense Ministry has been positively lyrical in his opacity – “Words are unnecessary,” the Minister tweeted on Sunday, with acknowledgments to Depeche Mode (surely a first), “they can only do harm.”   “Plans love silence,” his deputy added, “there will be no announcement about the beginning.”

Ukrainian operational security has indeed been impressive – 3 days after the offensive has begun, western observers have little sense for how it is faring.

Offensive Aims

Although the Ukrainians have managed to disguise the exact timing, details and initial objectives of the offensive, its overall objective will be to break the land bridge between Russian forces in the south, and those in the east, while enabling Ukrainian forces to move artillery into positions from which it can range the entire Crimea peninsular. 

The Russians of course will be expecting this.  What they won’t know is where the Ukrainians will make their main thrust to penetrate Russian lines.  In the aftermath of the Kharkiv offensive which lost momentum after the initial success, western military officials will have been advising their Ukrainian counterparts to pick one or two points on the Russian line, create a violently executed penetration and then – without delay – push into the gap an armor heavy exploitation force comprising 8 or more Brigades.  The US and UK have probably had a hand in selecting those penetration points – areas of the line where terrain, morale, training, numbers or resources make the defenders particularly vulnerable.  

The next step would be to create diversions up and down the 1000 km line, creating ambiguity about the exact location and timing of the attack.   The exploitation force will have to be moved into position without inciting suspicion a task which -- on the modern all-visible battlefield -- will involve distracting rather than deceiving the enemy. 

What’s riding on this for Ukraine

As emphasized by all Ukrainian officials from Zelensky down, victory must mean expulsion of all Russian boots from Ukrainian soil.  Anything short of that, would be seen by Ukrainians as defeat. This perception isn’t born purely from desire for revenge – but from the understanding that a ceasefire in situ will be seen by the Russians as an opportunity to prepare for the next phase.

Even Ukraine’s staunchest allies however will be aware that this goal sets a high bar – it will require Ukraine to quickly obtain its goals without heavy loss to convince them that the next phase is viable. “Give us the tools, and we will finish the job,” has been the message thus far from Ukraine’s military leadership – but they will also be aware of the yawning gulf between these war aims and shortfalls in material and trained manpower, shortfalls that could hinder their ability to launch a viable exploitation force through the gap made by the initial assault. Absent a good showing in this attack, Ukraine will likely see a corresponding drop off in western support for its wider objectives and pressure to nudge Zelensky to the negotiation table. 

NATO members must be sensing along with the prospect of this offensive, a culminating point approaching – the point at which the net result thus far: a weakened Russia and a stronger NATO – becomes less important to member nations than the economic cost of continued conflict, and the real threat that an unhinged Putin will pull some globally disruptive stunt.   Zelensky and his generals know that the offensive must get off on the right foot – there will be no opportunities to correct a false start.

What Rides on this for Russia:

The Russians, on the other hand, will be determined to complete their conquest of Donbas before a ceasefire.  This can be no secret to anyone – Putin has repeatedly stated his intention to seize this eastern province and liberate its Russian speaking population from the “inequities” of Ukrainian rule.  The fact that this same population, or what is left of them, is heartily sick of Russia’s efforts to liberate them will matter not at all to the Russian President, were he aware of them.  The recent wrangling among Putin’s subordinates about who was making the most headway around Bahkmut reflects their understanding of just how important a victory in Donbas is to their leader.

What we Know Now

Russian military bloggers were first to report that the offensive was under way when, on the night of 4 June, Ukrainian units advanced towards Velyka Novosilka in Donbas followed by an attack on Novodonetske, south-west of Donetsk city. At first it appeared that this might be one of the Ukrainian’s chosen penetration points – the positions were manned by a Russian Naval Infantry unit that had been heavily depleted by the summer’s fighting. Rupturing the line here was certainly a viable option since it would have given the Ukrainians potential avenues of advance south and east.  But – according again to Russian bloggers – the attack appeared to be understrength, involving only a company’s worth of vehicles – and was subsequently withdrawn.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians attacked in earnest into the northern and western outskirts of Bakhmut, gaining an estimated 5 kilometers of headway on the first night.

At the other end of the Russian line, in the south, the most dramatic development occurred a day later when the Nova Kharkova dam collapsed causing massive flooding across Kherson province. Ukraine had accused Russia of mining the dam months ago and it appears likely that this was a deliberate act by the Russians to thwart a Ukrainian assault across the river.  It is unlikely that the Ukrainians were planning such an operation: a wet-gap crossing is a complex, high-risk operation even when you are holding all the cards, and the dam’s destruction looks more like an act of desperation than a savvy operational move.  The dam’s collapse also puts paid – at least for the time being – to any Russian plans to counter-attack across the river thus enabling the Ukrainians to reposition forces for that region, if they haven’t already done so.

In any case, if the Ukrainian plan is to sever Russian forces in Donbas from those in the south – with its main effort being focused in the Zaporizhzhia region, then the destruction of the dam – over 100 miles away -- is unlikely to have any direct effect on Ukrainian operations. 

Still to come: The Main Punch

So far, all reports indicate a higher intensity phase of shaping operations rather than main effort.

The first clue that we have not yet seen the main punch comes from Russian reporting to the contrary.

Yesterday, Russia’s defense ministry said that Ukraine had thrown its 23rd and 31st mechanized brigades, including two tank battalions, at the front.  The 23^rd and 31^st are good units, but both have been fighting in Bakhmut for months, and neither is among the 9 designated assault brigades that have been preparing for this offensive for months.  The assault brigades have also been equipped with cutting edge breaching equipment – none of which has been seen yet. Russian bloggers also comment that there still is no sign of Ukraine’s most advanced battle tanks, leading to the conclusion that the Ukrainians are still working their way through the first line of defensive positions in sector – preparing the way for the exploitation force.  With just 12 Brigades total to play with, they will do everything possible to obfuscate time and place of commitment. 

As to what happens next, even seasoned pundits are kept guessing. For my part, I would expect more Ukrainian attacks intended to shape the battlefield – causing the Russians to divert resources and even commit their reserves. This they have already partially done, moving several VDV (Airborne) units, which were part of their operational reserve, to Bakhmut in the last few days.

If pushed to guess, I would say that the Ukrainains have decided to strike decisively in Donbas first with Bakhmut being their primary objective, before launching an attack to breach Russian positions in Zaporizhia, aimed at Melitipol.

I could have course be wrong – in which case I will probably have to build up my subscriber again from scratch….

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