Horns of a Dilemma

Why the Ukrainian request for long-range fires is a contentious Issue

Ben Wallace, the UK’s defense secretary, made waves during the NATO summit at Vilnius in a sidebar discussion with journalists when he suggested that Ukrainian officials downplay their demands for military aid and show more gratitude for Western allies that have spent tens of billions of dollars to supply Ukraine with weapons and training.

“There is a slight word of caution here, which is, whether we like it or not people want to see gratitude,” Mr. Wallace said.

“You know, we’re not Amazon,” Mr. Wallace continued, chiding Ukraine for requesting American long-range missiles “within minutes” of being given cluster munitions last week.

Wallace is a highly respected figure in NATO, well-known for his occasional off-the-cuff comments that many find refreshingly direct in a setting not given to such displays of honesty. 

Giving Until it Hurts

The UK has recently agreed to provide Ukraine with the Storm Shadow Cruise Missile, despite having only somewhere between 800 and 1,000 in stock.  According to Wallace, the Brits have almost completely depleted their inventory of mine-clearing vehicles, to equip Ukraine for the ongoing offensive. The US administration agreed to provide cluster munitions despite the opposition of several NATO allies – to include the United Kingdom. Wallace’s comments were a timely reminder that even for a cause that weakens NATO’s chief adversary while strengthening the alliance, neither country can afford to offer a blank check.

HIMARS, ATACMs and GMRLS

The long-range missiles at issue now, are the US Army’s Tactical Missile System or ATACMs – a misnomer really since the reason that Ukraine wants them is so that it can reach targets beyond the tactical space.  ATACMs can be fired from the now famous High Mobility Rocket System (HIMARS) with a range of 300 kilometers, as opposed to the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets currently supplied to Ukraine by the United States, which range just 80 kilometers.

Operational Fires – a US Shortfall

Only 4,000 ATACMs have been made since they entered service in the 80s, and until a replacement comes online several years from now, these stocks will have to support US war plans elsewhere – notably Taiwan and Korea.   And when it comes to long range artillery and tactical missile systems – covering the range of operational fires, roughly 40 to 300 kilometers, the United States is playing catch-up.  The reasons for this shortfall would take a separate article to discuss in detail – save to say that it’s not for want of trying – at least two multi billion-dollar procurement programs aimed on fixing this gap, were abandoned when it appeared that the solutions were over-budget, over-complicated, and impractical.  The gap is rendered more acute by our commitments around the world in places other than Ukraine.

China, for instance, has an impressive inventory of multiple rocket launchers that can match the 300km range of ATACMs – with the option of extending that range using a recently fielded ballistic missile. The Taiwan Strait is just 180 kilometers wide. 

Ukraine and Fires 101

Nevertheless, for the Ukrainians, the requirement for long range fires is real, and will likely have a bearing on the outcome of the offensive, if not the war itself.  Ukraine needs a missile system to strike targets in what is known by military planners as the deep battle or operational space. Perhaps the easiest way to understand this requirement is to separate targets into 3 brackets which align with the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.   

Tactical strikes affect a relatively narrow sector of the front and aimed at targets – troops, positions, vehicles, and C-2 nodes that impede an enemy unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. Unit in this case means what are generally referred to as tactical units:  any organization up to Division level – but this of course is dependent on the scale of the war.  If all you have is a handful of divisions – taking one out of action is going to have operational level consequences. There are no hard rules when it comes to distance, but generally the tactical space extends out to the maximum range of tube artillery, roughly 40 kilometers – beyond which the operational space continues to the limit of most tactical missile systems, around 300 kilometers.

At the operational level, your intent in striking targets is to influence the enemy commander’s ability to accomplish his mission – examples might include command and control nodes above division level, ammunition and logistics storage facilities and re-supply routes.   Counter-battery fire, usually directed at firing batteries or even individual pieces is usually conducted at the tactical level – but if your aim is to remove, even for a limited period, an indirect fire capability by destroying at one fell swoop multiple firing batteries, sensors or command and control nodes, then you are in the operational space.

At the strategic level – fires are intended to affect the opposing nation’s ability or will to continue the war.  The series of strikes in Russia since the beginning of this year, indicate that the Ukrainians are active in this space, and continue to refine a variety of methods for delivering pain to mother Russia.  NATO members have made it clearly apparent that they will not provide weapons in this space, for concerns about escalation.

Russians Adapt Too

The advent of HIMARS in June of last year with GMRLRs, was initially a game changer in the tactical space. The Ukrainians used HIMARs to good effect, targeting ammo depots and command and control nodes across the front. The much-maligned Russian military is nevertheless an adaptive organization. High explosives will have this effect – if delivered in sufficient quantity to make you feel pain, but not enough to bring you to your knees.  By late September or so, it became apparent that the GMRLs effect was on the wane. This was because no matter how well trained the crews, GMLRS came with one key limitation that offered the Russians ready sanctuary: range.  In this case, the cost was simply to move key assets out of range into the operational space.

There are high value assets whose mission makes it impractical to move beyond 80 kilometers from the front: tactical C-2 nodes and tube artillery for instance. These assets, the Russians learned to protect using dispersion and fortification.  By design, the GMLRs warhead fragments on impact, which makes it a very useful target for vehicles and troops in the open, but less so the more that they are dug in.  And, since last Fall, the Russians have claimed success in shooting down GMLRs using ground-based air defense systems – a claim affirmed by the Royal United Services Institute, with the proviso that this is technique is highly inefficient in terms of relative cost. Incidentally, the Ukrainians have also adapted to the greatest Russian counter-battery threat: the Lancet loitering munition – through the widespread use of dummy positions for high value firing assets such as HIMARS.  Adaptation makes it unlikely that a single weapon system will, by itself, be a game changer.

Horns of a Dilemma

The solution is a concept familiar to military planes and pundits alike – and the objective of any self-respecting fire support planner – which is to put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma: in seeking to avoid one weapon, he makes himself more vulnerable to another. Drip-feeding ever more capable systems enables any enemy – and the Russians are no exception – to avoid such a fate, by dealing with one horn at a time.

This will mean employing multiple long-range capabilities –without getting too focused on specific platforms -- at sufficient scale to put the Russians on the horns of dilemma.  ATACMs may contribute to this goal, but it cannot be the only solution.  ATACMs combined with long range drones and Storm Shadow and the recently promised French SCALP missiles would be a start – along with plans to add F-16s armed with NATO compatible missile systems to keep the pot bubbling. These are the discussions that should be taking place, rather than the wish list of platforms that prompted Wallace to draw comparisons with Amazon.